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Abstract
One of the fundamental uses of surveys is the measurement of policy preferences. We
can ask voters how they locate themselves on policy dimensions of substantive interests,
and we can ask them how they perceive the positions of political parties. Likewise,
we can use surveys to get political elite to reveal their policy positions or experts to
judge the positions of parties on a set of salient policy dimensions. Increasingly, such
surveys present respondents with issue scales defined as trade-offs between different
policy goals. Surprisingly, scholars have not paid much attention to the fact that
such scales are directional and include an implicit reference point: the status quo.
We examine the effects of indicating an explicit status quo midpoint in trade-off issue
questions using an experimental setup in an online survey that was part of the German
National Election Study in 2009. We show that status quo labeling has three major
effects. First, the indication of the status quo significantly reduces item non-response.
Second, issue scales with status quo indication change respondents’ self-placement and
the perception of political parties due to the provision of an explicit reference point.
Third, individually perceived ideological distances between a voter and her preferred
party are smaller when a status quo is indicated. This leads to a slightly stronger
predictor of ideological distance in a conditional logit model of vote choice. The findings
have implications for designers and users of voter and expert surveys.
1 Introduction
One of the fundamental uses of surveys is the measurement of policy preferences. We can ask
voters how they locate themselves on policy dimensions of substantive interests, and we can
ask them how they perceive the positions of political parties. Likewise, we can investigate
how the ideology of party supporters matches the perceived position of parties. Likewise,
elite surveys ask political candidates or members of parliament about their policy positions.
Finally, an increasing number of comparative scholars use expert surveys to generate data
on party positions on several substantive policy dimensions. Increasingly, these surveys ask
respondents about their spatial location, or that of political parties, on issue scales defined
as trade-offs between different policy goals. For example, one of the most commonly used
scales in voter and expert surveys asks about the trade-off between taxation and public
spending. For the most part, survey researchers as well as scholars using the estimates in
secondary analysis have not paid much attention to the fact that such scales are directional
and include an implicit reference point: the status quo. This omission is surprising because
the theoretical and empirical implications of taking the status quo seriously are manifold.
We examine the possible effects of the status quo indication through a survey experiment,
a random split, within an online pre-election study module of the German National Election
Study conducted in 2009. All respondents were presented with a common 11-point issue scale
formulated as a trade-off between taxation and spending, in which only the endpoints of the
scale were defined as “prefer lower taxes even if this implies reduced social spending”, and
“prefer more social spending even if this implies increasing taxes”. The treatment group was
additionally provided with a labeled midpoint explicitly verbalizing the status quo (“things
should remain the same”).
We show that simple status quo labeling has three major effects. First, the indication of
the status quo significantly reduces item non-response. More respondents answer the ques-
tion when the reference category is labelled. Second, issue scales with status quo indication
change respondents’ self-placement and the perception of political parties. These two points
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suggest that the omission of a status quo label may actually result in measurement error on
the issue scales. We demonstrate the presence of an observable implication of measurement
error: on average party identifiers indicate a significantly smaller distance to their preferred
party. We show that the differences in ideological distances between voters and parties af-
fect secondary analyses by examining vote choice as a function of ideological proximity to
political parties. Our results suggest that ideological distance is a slightly stronger predictor
of vote choice using distances calculated from measures from a scale that includes a status
quo.
Our results have implications for expert surveys on party positions as well. We examine
how respondents that know the status quo perceive party positions. The results indicate
that the party system as a whole seems to be perceived more polarized with the status quo
indicated. This means that the status quo serves as an important reference point and that
results from expert judgments on party positions may actually generate more variation in
party positions that is otherwise possible.
Our paper is structured as follows. We first discuss examples of voter and expert surveys
that attempt to measure policy positions on trade-off dimensions. Subsequently, we describe
our survey experiment and investigate item non-response, self-placements of party identifiers,
perceived party positions among all respondents and among those who (partially) know the
status quo. Finally, we compare the ideological distances between the control and treatment
group and show the effects of using such distances in a vote choice model.
2 Policy Trade-offs and Issue Scales in Surveys
Politics is the art of compromise and much of policy making involves making tough choices
under a budget constraint. One of the most essential trade-offs is the one between taxation
and spending. How much such government spend and how much such these efforts cost? At
the heart of such a trade-off lies the notion of non-separability of preferences: an individual’s
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preference for the outcome on one issue depends on the outcome of other issues. In other
words, agreeing to increase public spending means one is also willing to raise taxes to pay
for it. Conversely, pushing for lower taxes implies that one agrees that some public spending
programs should be cut.
In an effort to measure the positions of voters and politicians it has become a widespread
phenomenon to include issue questions formulated as a trade-off between different alterna-
tives in surveys. In a pilot study for the 1996 American National Election Study, respondents
were asked several separate questions in order to detect non-separability across preferences
for tax decreases, deficit increases, or defense cuts in order to increase spending on domes-
tic programs (Hansen 1998, Lacy 2001). In an ideal world, we would want to examine all
possible combinations of issue to detect nonseparability, but practical limitations resulting
from limited survey time make such an approach impossible (Lacy 2001, p.254). Thus, much
more common in voter and expert survey research are issue questions providing respondents
with a scale that allows them to place themselves and others on the policy dimension of
interest. Such questions define the endpoints of the scale as one extreme trade-off and the
other endpoint as the other extreme. Typically, the questions come with 7-, 11-, or 20-point
scales. A typical presentation of the taxation versus spending trade-off defines one endpoint
as “promotes raising taxes to increase public services” and the other as “promotes cutting
public services to cut taxes” (Benoit & Laver 2006).
To our knowledge, one aspect of the scales has remained completely underappreciated in
the literature: the implicit assumption that respondents know the location of the status quo.
In fact, due to the directional nature of the trade-off (e.g. “raise taxes”, “increase public
services”), respondents are expected to be able to give an estimate of their own position or
that of a political party relative to the reference point of no change. Such a reference point,
however, is not indicated in the question. If one takes the directional issue scales seriously,
several theoretical and empirical challenges ensue. First, respondents are supposed to identify
the precise location of the status quo on the scale. This is crucial because some voters or
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parties are likely to prefer the way things are, and would propagate the status quo over
change. Second, even if all respondents are factually aware of the status quo and locate
this point identically, policy making theories and vote choice theories alike need to take into
account that estimates can only be interpreted relative to the status quo.
There are several potential problems when using positions derived from scales formulated
as trade-offs. Over time comparison is, in fact, impossible. If the status quo is indicated
and the question is repeated in the same country, the two measurements are not comparable
because the status quo might have changed. Because placements are relative to the status
quo, we do not know whether the status quo has changed (or not) or whether the positions
have changed (or not). Suppose a party is estimated to promote raising taxes to increase
public spending in a voter or expert survey at t0. The party then enters a government
coalition and changes policy to its desired level of taxation and increases spending in various
policy areas. Then another survey is taken at t1 asking for the position of the party on
the same scale again. Now, the party position should in fact be located on the status quo.
It has reached its policy goals. The party should neither want to raise taxes to increase
spending nor should it want to cut spending to cut taxes. If one ignores the change of the
status quo over time, the researcher, however, would conclude that the position of the party
has changed, even though the position has remained constant and the status quo changed
instead. Without knowing how the status quo changes, we are, in fact, unable to make any
comparison across time using survey data on issues questions like these. This applies to
voter surveys, elite surveys, and expert surveys on party positions alike.
Even if estimates are not used as time series, there are other survey-specific effects that
deserve attention. First, if the issue question is formulated as a trade-off and the status quo
is labelled, we may expect that more respondents answer the question because the reference
point is indicated. Second, an explicit indication of the status quo may furthermore affect
the self placement and the perceived location of parties. As we show later, this may have
consequences in secondary analyses.
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Figure 1: Consequences of SQ Indication in Surveys of Party Positions
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Take the example of expert surveys on party positions. Such expert surveys have become
a prominent source of party ideology in comparative politics. Expert surveys that formulate
policy issues as trade-off questions have become ubiquitous (e.g. Laver & Hunt 1992, Benoit
& Laver 2006, Benoit & McElroy 2007, Rohrschneider & Whitefield 2007, Steenbergen &
Marks 2007, Wiesehomeier & Benoit 2009). One way to use expert estimates is to calculate
the ideological range of multiparty governments to predict the extent of policy change pro-
duced by the government (e.g. Tsebelis 2002). Figure 1 shows the range of three possible
government coalitions whose positions are derived from a hypothetical expert survey. The
scale corresponds to the trade-off between raising taxes while increasing public spending and
cutting services to cut taxes. Suppose the expert survey yields the positions of four political
parties (A, B, C, and D). If the status quo is not known, veto player theory would predict
that, ceteris paribus, coalition BC would produce more laws, coalition CD slightly less, and
coalition AB even fewer laws. In a statistical model, ideological range would be expected to
have a negative effect on law production. This ignores, however, the theoretical insight that
we would expect no change if the status quo is inside the pareto set of a government coalition.
As the issue scale already implicitely defines the location of the status quo, assuming that
it is located at the midpoint of the scale, then the coalition BC would not be able to agree
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on change. While having the smallest ideological range, this government coalition should
produce no significant law.
The example demonstrates that surveys may contain information that needs to be in-
corporated in theoretical predictions. In this example, it means that trade-off issue scales
should probably not be used to simply generate estimates of ideological polarization of gov-
ernments to make predictions about policy change, coalition formation or other phenomena
given that they contain an implicit location of the status quo. Some may argue that this
is an unlikely phenomenon and that the status quo ought not to be included in too many
government coalitions. This supposition is false. Figure 2 plots the ideological distances
of multi-party governments on the important taxes versus spending dimension using party
position estimates generated by the expert survey of Benoit & Laver (2006). Assume the
implicit status quo is located at the midpoint of the scale (10.5), shown as a dotted blue line.
Countries whose government range includes the status quo are highlighted in red.1 Out of
33 countries, over half (19) of governments have an ideological range that includes the status
quo. If we are faithful to our theoretical concept, then such governments should produce
no change, independent of their range. We are not aware that this information has been
incorporated in secondary analysis using the data.
The issue is not just limited to expert surveys. Voter surveys include issue questions as
trade-offs as well (e.g Adams & Merrill 2008). The European election study in 1999 and
2004 used an item on European integration formulated as a trade-off: “Some say European
unification should be pushed further. Others say it already has gone too far”. In addition,
elite surveys ask such questions as well Scully & Farrell (2003).
1Government parties were identified using the information provided in the appendix in Benoit & Laver
(2006). The data are for 2002-2003.
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Figure 2: Theoretical Implications of SQ in Issue Scales
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3 A Survey Experiment
What then is the impact of explicitly indicating the status quo when measuring policy pref-
erences of voters and parties? We address this question by conducting a survey experiment,
a random split, within an online pre-election study module of the German National Election
Study in 2009. This experiment allow us to explore the effects in a multiparty system with
two large parties (SPD and CDU/CSU) and three small parties (FDP, Greens, The Left).
All respondents were asked the following question:
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Some prefer lower taxes even if this implies reducing social spending. Others
prefer more social spending even if this implies increasing taxes. In your opinion,
where do the parties stand on this? And what is your position on this issue? 2
Respondents were presented with an 11-point response scale to, first, locate parties and
subsequently locate themselves on the same scale. An additional “Don’t know” option
was provided on the screen as well. The layout of the response scale was experimentally
manipulated. Two forms were administered randomly. While for the control group (nc =
496) only the endpoints of the scale (1 and 11) were labeled (1 indicates lower taxes even if
this implies reducing social spending, 11 indicates more social spending even if this implies
increasing taxes), the respondents for the treatment group (nt = 489) also were provided
with a labeled midpoint at 6 explicitly verbalizing the status quo as “things should remain
the same”.3
To sum up, all respondents are using the same response scale — either with or without an
explicitly labeled status quo midpoint — to locate parties and themselves on this particular
policy dimension. Thus, we can investigate the consequences of including the status quo on
the respective response scale on the type as well as the degree of the individual responses.
Given that respondents can opt out by clicking on the ‘Don’t know” option, we will first
analyze the effects on item non-response as a different type of answer before we analyze the
effects of including a status quo on location of party positions as well as the respondents’ self-
placements. The respective causal effect is then estimated by comparing the mean ratings
across the two experimental groups.
2The actual German question reads: ”Manche wollen weniger Steuern und Abgaben, auch wenn das
weniger sozialstaatliche Leistungen bedeutet. Andere wollen mehr sozialstaatliche Leistungen, auch wenn
das mehr Steuern und Abgaben bedeutet. Wie stehen Ihrer Meinung nach die Parteien dazu? Wie ist das
bei Ihnen? Wo stehen Sie bei dieser Frage?”
3The status quo indication in German: “Es soll so bleiben wie bisher”.
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3.1 Effects on Item Non-Response
In this section we investigate to what extent the indication of the status quo position on issue
scales affects the level of item non-response. When asked to locate the party on our policy
item, respondents could either provide a substantive answer and locate the party somewhere
on the response scale or they could opt out and register a “Don’t know” answer. Under what
conditions are respondents more likely to register a substantive answer? And if they do not:
what are the effects of item non-response?
According to theories of survey response (Krosnick 1991, Tourangeau & Rasinski 1988,
Zaller & Feldman 1992), respondents might not be motivated to come up with an answer
based on a comprehensive memory search, even when they are willing to cooperate. The
notion of cognitive miser suggests that respondents are attracted to cues or other simple
heuristics. They are likely to use them in order to find accessible considerations with which
they can justify their response if necessary. Thus, respondents sample over the most recent
considerations that are accessible to them after interpreting the survey question, in order to
provide a meaningful answer to the question. If the context of a survey question is complex,
and not relevant to the respondents, they are less likely to respond to it and, consequently,
are more likely to register a “Don’t know” answer. Hence, based on this literature we expect
that the more respondents are motivated to deal with such a policy item and the more
respondents are sophisticated to be able to comprehend the survey question the more likely
they are to provide a substantive response instead of choosing the “Don’t know” option.
This expectation is derived from the theories of survey response and should hold in
both samples, the treatment as well as in the control group. What are the particular effects,
though, of explicitly labeling the midpoint of the response scale - as it is done in the treatment
condition - on item non-response?
There are at least two conceivable mechanisms at work when respondents encounter scales
with a labeled midpoint (Tourangeau, Rips & Rasinski 2000, p.244). First, a label might
simply make a particular response option more salient. Second, a label might facilitate the
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comprehension of a response option. Thus instead of a non-response, i.e. a “Don’t know”
answer, survey respondents are more likely to locate parties on the response scale if the scale
is easier to comprehend. Including an labeled midpoint in the layout of the response scale
should facilitate comprehension. Specifically, the midpoint provides a reference point for
making a clear directional statement in either direction. Thus we expect respondents to be
more likely to locate a party on the response scale and less likely to provide a “Don’t know”
answer if they are in the treatment rather than the control condition.
Following the literature in political behavior, sophistication is operationalized as the level
of factual knowledge a respondent has about politics. We will construct an additive political
knowledge scale based on two knowledge items. These items ask the respondents to provide
the status quo regarding the marginal as well as top income tax bracket using a closed-ended
format (four different tax rates as well as an “Don’t know” option). Summing up the correct
answers we get a political knowledge score ranging from 0 (for 65% of all respondents) to 2
(for 11% of all respondents).
Moreover, in order to operationalize motivation we need a measure that indicates the
relevance a survey respondent attaches to locating a particular party on the response scale
rather than opting out and providing a non-response. We assume that if someone identifies
with a particular party she should be particularly motivated to locate this party on the
11-point response scale. Thus we measure motivation to locate a party on the response scale
through a dummy variable that indicates whether respondents identify themselves with the
party they are asked to locate.
We investigate whether the indication of status quo position on issue scales affects the
level of non-response by examining respondents’ location of political parties. We pool all
observations from both treatment and control group and estimate probit models for every
party predicting wether or not respondents locate this party on the 11-point response scale.
Three out of four respondents locate the two large parties in Germany, CDU and SPD, on
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Table 1: Effects of Item Non-Response on Party Positions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CDU SPD FDP Greens Left
Experimental Treatment
SQ Indication 0.178* 0.130 0.161+ 0.175* 0.231*
(0.090) (0.089) (0.088) (0.086) (0.086)
Control Variables
SQ Knowledge 0.457* 0.409* 0.451* 0.436* 0.410*
(0.076) (0.074) (0.073) (0.070) (0.069)
Party ID Dummy 0.264* 0.336* 0.674* 0.374* 0.567*
(0.111) (0.112) (0.195) (0.155) (0.188)
Constant 0.387* 0.407* 0.302* 0.235* 0.177*
(0.072) (0.071) (0.067) (0.066) (0.066)
Observations 985 985 985 985 985
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
this scale.4 Slightly less respondents locate the remaining three parties in parliament (FDP
73%, Greens 70%; Left party 69%) on the response scale instead of providing a non-response.
Our expectation is that respondents in the treatment group should be more likely to
locate a party. In other words, the coefficient for the dummy variable SQ Indication that
indicates wether or not a respondent got the treatment should be positive. This should
hold independent from alternative explanations, including a respondent’s level of motivation,
measured as party identification for a particular party, and sophistication, measured through
a political knowledge scale.
Table 1 provides an overview of the results estimating whether respondents provide party
positions as a function of political knowledge, party identification and our experimental
treatment.5 Our results provide support for all expectations. Across all parties, we find
4Respondents from Bavaria locate the CSU instead because the CDU is not on the ballot there.
5The dummy for party identification is 1 if the respondent indicated the respective party in the identifi-
cation question. Further robustness checks show that the experimental randomization worked as it should.
With the exception of party identification for the Left party, no covariate in the models we estimate can
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that including a labeled midpoint increases the likelihood that respondents provide a party
position on the respective issue scale. And this effect holds even if we control for political
knowledge or wether a respondent identifies with the party that she is asked to locate. The
respective coefficients are all positive and, with the exception of the SPD, significant.
In order to provide a measure of the causal effect of providing a labeled midpoint indicat-
ing the status quo of this issue on the likelihood of providing a substantive response instead
of “Don’t know” answer we calculated first-differences. The causal effect we are interested in
is the predicted difference in the probability to locate a particular party on the scale across
the two experimental groups. Given that the probit model is non-linear and non-additive we
specify a priori values for the remaining independent variables in the model. In Figure 3 we
provide the estimated size of these differences together with their simulated 90% confidence
intervals for respondents without any partisan anchors (i.e., PID = 0 for all parties) and
minimum value on our political knowledge scale.
The figure provides an overview over the estimated sizes of the causal effect of providing
an additional label for the midpoint that indicates the status quo on this issue on the
likelihood to locate that party on the same scale. Providing such a label makes respondents
in our chosen scenario between 5 to 8 percentage points more likely to locate a respective
party on the scale than without labeling the status quo. Again, merely for the location of the
SPD on the scale we do not find a significant difference between treatment and control group
even if the point prediction of the difference is positive as expected. Those results seem to
suggest that providing a label for the status quo facilitates the comprehension of such an
issue scale. More respondents have to be dropped from further analysis due to non-response
if we continue with the current practice in mass surveys to not label the status quo of such
issue scales. Note that in both experimental groups respondents have the possibility to opt
out, but fewer actually do so when the status quo is explicitly provided. We have reason to
be systematically predicted by our experimental manipulation. Finding more Left party identifiers in the
control group that in the treatment group we suspect that the low number of party identifiers for such a
small party is responsible for that.
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Figure 3: Estimating the Causal Effect of Providing a labeled Midpoint on the Likelihood
to locate a Party on the Issue Scale.
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believe that a similar conclusion applies to the analysis of issue scales with elite and expert
surveys as well.
If survey respondents seem to understand issue scales with a labeled status quo better
than without it, we will next discuss the potential consequences of this result for the self-
placement of respondents as well as their placements of parties. We will focus in particular
on the placements of two types of respondents that should be particularly likely to provide
a substantive response: “expert respondents” defined in terms of political knowledge as
well as the group of partisans as the die-hard supporters of a particular party. In addition
to examining differences at the aggregate level across both treatment and control group,
we also expect to find effects that should play out at the individual-level in the way how
partisans perceive the individual distances to the party they identify with. Given that there
is significant item non-response on the indication of a party position on the issue scale, this
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result suggests that the substantive placement of parties may also be perceived differently
between the two groups. If this is the case, one may have to be concerned with potential
measurement error effects. In the following, we examine the effects of the status quo labeling
treatment on the self-placements of party identifiers, the perceived party positions, as well
as on those who actually know the status quo.
3.2 Effects on Self-Placements
We investigate whether the question framing affects how party supporters in the sample per-
ceive their position on the issue scale. Party supporters are those respondents who answered
a question asking whether they identify with a particular political party. Figure 4 plots the
average position of party identifiers for each party, separating those respondents whose scale
included the status quo from those whose scale excluded it. In addition, the figure plots
the 95% confidence interval for each point estimate. The results show interesting differences
between treatment and control group. First, positions are perceived to be more extreme
(away from the midpoint) when the status quo is indicated. The most blatant example is
the position of the FDP. While the FDP is often known as a centrist party - it has switched
coalitions back and forth with the CDU/CSU and the SPD during German post-war history
-, research has shown its consistent neoliberal stances on economic issues. The position of
the FDP varies quite drastically. In the random split excluding the status quo, we would
conclude that the positions of FDP party identifiers is located centrally on the scale. In fact,
the confidence interval includes the (hypothetical) value of the status quo, so we cannot re-
ject the hypothesis that FDP identifiers would prefer the status quo over change. Compare
this to party identifiers of the FDP when the status quo is clearly indicated. The average
position is now much more extreme (3.6) than before (5.2), and the confidence interval no
longer includes the status quo. Thus, we might be tempted to claim that the FDP, based
on the placements of its supporters, is a centrist party in one sample, but a more extreme
party claiming lower taxes and reduced social spending in the sample with the status quo.
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Figure 4: Self-Placements on scales with and without status quo indication.
Self−Placements of Party Identifiers
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
CDU/CSU l
CDU/CSU (SQ) l
FDP l
FDP (SQ) l
GREENS l
GREENS (SQ) l
LINKE l
LINKE (SQ) l
SPD l
SPD (SQ) l
Prefers lower taxes even if this
implies reducing social spending
Prefers more social spending
even if this implies increasing taxes
Things should
remain the same
The results are equally interesting for the other parties. Take, for instance, the position
of the CDU/CSU. Whereas the FDP is more centrist than the CDU/CSU in the version
without the SQ, it is clearly - and significantly - more extreme than the CDU/CSU in the
version with the SQ. In other words, the simple question framing resulted in the parties to
leapfrog positions on the issue scale, painting a drastically different picture of the German
party system. The other positions of party identifiers reveal other insights. The Greens
perceive themselves on average more center-right without the status quo (average position
smaller than SQ), and more center-left with the status quo (average position greater than
SQ). Similarly, the identifiers of the Left Party are slightly more left with the status quo than
without it. Finally, the SPD, the party that has ideologically transformed itself the most in
Germany during the last decade, is perceived centrist without the status quo and slightly
to the center-right with the status quo. For each party, the confidence intervals between
the random splits overlap due to the small sample size resulting from limiting the analysis
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to party identifiers. Nevertheless, we believe the results indicate an interesting pattern in
the data that should be of relevance for scholars of individual political behavior and party
politics alike.
3.3 Effects on Party Positions
Another way to analyze the effects of the question framing is to compare the party positions
as perceived by all respondents. To do so, we analyze the question regarding the placement
of the parties rather than the self-placements. Figure 5 plots the average party positions
and the corresponding confidence intervals. For this question, the aggregate results remain
remarkably stable. The ordering of the parties does not change, with the FDP, CSU, and
CDU perceived to be on the right of the status quo, and the Greens, SPD, and the Left Party
on the left of it. There is an indication that positions are perceived more extreme when the
status quo is indicated, in particular for the Left Party. But the confidence intervals in all
instances overlap and the difference of means is not statistically significant. Note that the
party positions that are perceived in the population are rather centrist, ranging on average
from 4.5 for the FDP to 7.4 for the Left on an 11-point scale.
One valid criticism that can be made about survey questions like this is that respondents
are overwhelmed in having to locate themselves and six party positions on a trade-off issue
scale like the one used here. In fact, effects between the two samples should be most apparent
only if respondents actually know what the status quo means (“things should remain the
same”). We therefore limited our sample to respondents who could answer an additional
knowledge question in the experiment. While we ideally would like to ask a question regard-
ing the levels of the trade-off, framing this trade-off in an understandable way in a survey
context is difficult. We therefore resorted to a second best alternative, asking for the current
level of the lowest income tax bracket, assuming that those respondents have a notion of
current levels of taxation giving their perceived level of public services.
Figure 6 plots the perceived party positions for the subset of respondents who answered
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Figure 5: Party Placements on scales with and without status quo indication.
Party Positions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
CDU l
CDU (SQ) l
CSU l
CSU (SQ) l
FDP l
FDP (SQ) l
GREENS l
GREENS (SQ) l
LINKE l
LINKE (SQ) l
SPD l
SPD (SQ) l
Prefers lower taxes even if this
implies reducing social spending
Prefers more social spending
even if this implies increasing taxes
Things should
remain the same
this knowledge question correctly. The results indicate a much stronger deviation between
the two samples. Note how the political parties are perceived more extreme when the status
quo is indicated. This is true for the CDU and CSU, who are perceived more to the right,
and the Greens, SPD, and Left Party who are perceived to stand more on the left. There
appears to be no change for the FDP, which is already located on one extreme of the political
spectrum. Thus, the party system appears somewhat more polarized on this issue when the
status quo is indicated. Another way to look at this is to consider the subset of respondents
knowing the status quo as experts. Thus, survey respondents that partially know what the
status quo means are more able to differentiate between the parties when such a status quo
is labelled in the question. This may have implications for expert surveys on party positions
as well, an issue we take up again in the conclusion.
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Figure 6: Party Placements of respondents who know SQ on scales with and without status
quo indication.
Party Positions
(respondents know SQ)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
CDU l
CDU (SQ) l
CSU l
CSU (SQ) l
FDP l
FDP (SQ) l
GREENS l
GREENS (SQ) l
LINKE l
LINKE (SQ) l
SPD l
SPD (SQ) l
Prefers lower taxes even if this
implies reducing social spending
Prefers more social spending
even if this implies increasing taxes
Things should
remain the same
3.4 Effects on Perceived Ideological Distances
Ideology in general, and policy preferences in particular, are widely considered to be a major
determinant of party choice in multiparty systems (e.g Adams & Merrill 2008, Bargsted
& Kedar 2009). In order to operationalize respondents’ reliance on policy considerations
scholars typically start by calculating the distance dij = vi − cij between the self-placement
vi of voter i on a particular policy scale and where she perceives the placement cij of party
j to be on this issue. In the previous section, we highlighted potential implications of
our experimental treatment on those constituent concepts from which typically squared (or
absolute) distances are calculated. In this section, we will focus on further consequences of
the previous findings.
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Table 2: Perceived Distance of Party Identifiers across Treatment and Control Group
DV: d2ij
SQ Indication -3.173*
(1.502)
Constant 9.733*
(1.078)
Observations 433
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
An explicit reference point apparently helps respondents to locate the parties on this scale.
Given that respondents’ self-placement and the perception of political parties also changed,
we expect to find more measurement error in the substantive responses of respondents in
the control group without the status quo indication. If this argument is valid it would imply
that trade-off issue scales with status quo indication are simply preferable measures. What
are observable implication of this assertion?
We assume that measurement error might have two consequences we are able to observe
and test. We are focusing here again on the group of partisans. Partisans, of all respondents,
should locate “their” party ideologically close to themselves. Measurement error arising from
harder-to-use answering scales should artificially increase the distances of partisans’ self-
placement and where they locate their party on this scale. In short, we can expect smaller
distances with status quo indication. Moreover, measurement error should add another
degree of uncertainty to the measurement of the distances. Thus, we expect larger variances
indicating larger amounts of uncertainty within the perceived distances between partisans
and their party if the status quo label is omitted. Conversely, we expect a smaller variance
across the perceived distances for partisans in the treatment group. Table 2 provides an
overview over the estimation result of regressing the respective status quo indication dummy
on the squared perceived distances for party identifiers.
A typical partisan in the treatment group does in fact place her her party systematically
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closer to herself when they get a labeled status quo as a reference point. The size of the
effect amounts to about 1.8 units on the issue scale. Thus partisans in the control group
without such an reference point place their party on average 1.8 scale units further away
from them than their counterparts in the treatment group would do. This supports the idea
that providing labels for the status quo of such issue scales can reduce a significant amount
of measurement error in these items.
Furthermore, Levene’s robust test statistic for the equality of variances between the
treatment and control group is highly significant (W0 = 10.7 df(1, 431) Pr > F = 0.001) -
as well as a standard test on the equality of standard deviations (treatment group:12.307,
control group: 18.49). Thus we have two independent tests that support our expectation
that measurement error increase the uncertainty how partisans perceive the distance to their
party and consequently have larger variance.
3.5 Secondary Effects: Perceived Policy Distance and Vote Choice
In the previous section we have shown that providing a label for the status quo does actually
reduce the measurement error that is inherent in the perceived distances between respondents
and where they place the parties on our issue scale. Finally, we further examine the effects
of the treatment by examining vote choice as a function of perceived policy distance between
voters and parties. If our distance measure is actually plagued by measurement error, and
more so in the control than in the treatment group, then we should expect to find a larger
coefficient in the random subsample that got the treatment. We predict the vote choice for
five parties (CDU, SPD, FDP, Green, Left Party) separately for treatment and control group
based on the perceived policy distance of all voters.
In addition to the perceived policy distance we control for potential non-policy factors in
a voter’s utility function by including a candidate differential that subtracts the popularity
ratings (another 11-point scale ranging from −5 to +5) of the two chancellor candidates
(Angela Merkel, CDU − Frank-Walter Steinmeier, SPD). Given that we include independent
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Table 3: Conditional Logit of Multiparty Vote Choice
DV: Vote Choice
Treatment Group
distance2 -0.044*
(0.008)
constant(SPD) 0.596*
(0.208)
candidate differential -3.636*
SPD vs.CDU (0.684)
constant(FDP) 0.047
(0.239)
candidate differential -0.126
FDP vs.CDU (0.547)
constant(Green) 0.337
(0.222)
candidate differential -1.754*
Green vs.CDU (0.596)
Control Group
distance2 -0.029*
(0.006)
constant(SPD) 0.316+
(0.187)
candidate differential -3.432*
SPD vs.CDU (0.575)
constant(FDP) -0.241
(0.220)
candidate differential -0.656
FDP vs.CDU (0.492)
constant(Green) 0.106
(0.202)
candidate differential -1.653*
Green vs.CDU (0.530)
Observations 2620
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
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variables that vary across the voters (candidate differential) as well as parties (distance2)
we estimate conditional logit models for the voters in each experimental group. We take the
CDU as reference group.
Table 3 provides some support for our expectations. It comes as no surprise that policy
considerations matter for vote choice - as well as non-policy factors. While a smaller ideo-
logical distance between a voter and a party increases the probability of voting for this party
in both samples, the distance2 coefficient in the treatment sample is larger, supporting our
expectation. The coefficient of the control group is about 30 percent smaller than the one
in the treatment group. Thus it seems to make a difference for the importance of policy
considerations as basis for individual vote-choices decisions as well. For the non-policy fac-
tors our estimation results suggest, that SPD voters and voters of the left have apparently
similar candidate differential effects. The more they prefer the SPD candidate over the CDU
candidate the less are they likely to cast a vote for the CDU.
Furthermore, we perform a Wald test for the equality of the distance2 coefficients. Given
that the two conditional logit models are fit on independent samples generated through
our experimental design our estimators are stochastically independent. The test rejects the
null hypothesis of equal distance2 coefficients across the two experimental groups at least
marginally. Further interpretations about the substantive impact of the difference between
treatment and control conditions will have to rely on predicted probabilities and simulated
confidence intervals that will be provided in the next iteration of this paper.
4 Conclusion
Why should researchers be concerned with the question framing of policy issue scales in
surveys? We examined the effects of indicating an explicit status quo midpoint in trade-off
issue questions using an experimental setup in an online survey that was part of the German
National Election Study in 2009. We believe that a simple change of question wording has
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several positive consequences for research on party positions and voter ideology.
Increasing item response. A direct consequence of the simple improved question wording
was a significant increase in item response. This may be beneficial not only in surveys with
thousands of respondents, but also in in expert surveys in which the number of respondents
is often small. Our alternative question wording might therefore be not only be more truthful
to the underlying directional theoretical concept, but it may also help experts — typically
political science scholars — place a large number of parties on a large number of dimensions.
Reducing measurement error. Two findings support the notion that measurement error
can be decreased. First, more respondents participate with a status quo indication. Second,
respondents that do answer indicate significantly smaller ideological distances to the party
they identify with.
Increasing variation. The implication for expert surveys is that the status quo might
help the expert — who may well be able to interpret the substantive meaning of the issue
scale — discriminate better between the positions of parties. In our setup, knowledgeable
respondents were more likely to place the parties away from the status quo. Therefore, party
systems may appear more polarized in surveys with the status quo indication, yielding in
more variation in the party positions.
Staying faithful to theoretical concepts. The final conclusion is more of a cautionary
advice. Deriving ideological distances for parties from trade-off issue scales in surveys may
be problematic because they contain an implicit status quo. Therefore, a government range
used to predict a political outcome may be substantively different if it includes a status quo
because spatial models would predict a negative outcome if the status quo is present in the
pareto set. We have shown that this may be problematic in expert surveys. However, only
a full replication of existing analysis will reveal the extent of the potential problems.
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